The Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania at the time of the Noble Democracy – a Polish Anomaly? by Malec, Jerzy
Jerzy Malec
Professor, Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5137-1977
Th e Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania at the time 
of the Noble Democracy – a Polish Anomaly?
1. Introduction; 2. Europe in the era of absolute monarchy; 3. Th e form of the state during the noble 
democracy; 4. Th e systemic degeneration of the state in the times of magnate oligarchy; 5. Summary.
1
Today, when we ponder upon the essence of Polish democracy, we eagerly refer 
to our traditions in the area, of the so-called the Nobles’ Democracy, which was 
born at the turn of the 15th century. It is even used at times as justifi cation of the 
defi ciencies in our current democratic order, even though the characteristic traits 
of that democracy of the noble estate included the spread of anarchy and excessive 
decentralisation of the State. Th is is because aft er its fall, Polish Statehood came to 
an end and with the Partitions, Polish society was denied any element of democ-
racy.
Did the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania (Rzeczpospolita) provide an im-
perfect standard of democratic order in the State in the days of the Nobles’ De-
mocracy? Or should we, rather, refer to this political structure of the state created 
in the 16th century as the Polish anomaly? What was the geopolitical reality that 
that system operated in? Th ese are but a handful of questions that require answers.
2
Th e basic political system of modern Europe was beyond doubt absolutism: 
a political structure lying at the other extreme from what was built in Poland by the 
middle ranking nobility. Th e latter gathered in the so-called Executive Movement 
demanding larger democracy and were hostile to the ideas of absolutum domin-
ium. Let us however briefl y review the developments that were observable in the 
state that drift ed toward absolutism.
STUDIA Z DZIEJÓW PAŃSTWA I  PRAWA POLSKIEGO
XXIII — 2020
STUDIES IN HISTORY OF POLISH STATE AND LAW 
e-ISSN 2450-6095; ISSN 1733-0335DOI: 10.48269/2450-6095-sdpipp-23-005
100 Jerzy Malec
Th e development of the absolutist form of the state was closely linked to 
the limiting of the political rights acquired by the estates at the time of an es-
tate-based system. In most cases this was paralleled by the signifi cant limitation, 
if not liquidation, of estate councils by the monarch and his takeover of absolute 
sovereign power.
Th e consolidation of all power in a single hand was characteristic of absolute 
monarchy, much like the institutional personifi cation of the highest state organ in 
the person of the ruler. Th e classic representative of this form of political structure, 
Louis XIV, is supposed to have expressed this principle in l’État, c’est moi (“the state 
is myself ”). Th e absolute ruler was at the same time the supreme legislator, execu-
tor of laws and judge. Th e state administration apparatus subject to the will of the 
monarch played an immeasurably important role in the reinforcement and secur-
ing of the ruler’s absolute power. Th is is why modern management structures ad-
justed to the needs were built both at central and local levels as part of the process 
of development and reinforcement of absolute power. At the same time, they were 
to provide the subjects with rational organisation, stability, order, and security.
Th e management of the state was based on two fundamental principles: cen-
tralism and bureaucracy. Th e fi rst was linked to the lower-ranking organ’s obliga-
tion to fall in line with the higher one, and eventually with the subordination of 
the entire structure of power to the monarch. Th e principle of bureaucracy in turn 
revolved around the professional character of the administration and its repre-
sentatives, i.e. offi  cers. With these in place, further organisation of the apparatus of 
power was gradually developing1 based, among other things, on the principles of 
departmentalism, hierarchic subordination, and collegiality.
Absolute monarchy was based on two principal pillars: powerful, centralised 
administration and a  permanently increasing permanent professional military 
force. Although an essential element of stability in exercising power, they were 
uncommonly expensive to wield. In the absolute monarchies of the 18th century, 
maintenance of the army consumed nearly a half of the state’s expenditure, while 
the successively developed administration accounted for not much less.
Absolutism went through various stages of development, and would assume 
diff erent characters in diff erent eras. From the early absolutism, via its classical 
form – the enlightened absolutism, to the fi nal form of police monarchy2. As a re-
sult, it survived in some states until the mid-19th century, and in Russia even to 
the early 20th.
1 D. Malec, J. Malec, Historia administracji i myśli administracyjnej, [History of administra-
tion and administrative thought], 2nd ed., Kraków 2003, pp. 15&ff , 31&ff .
2 S. Grodziski, Porównawcza historia ustrojów państwowych, [Comparative history of state 
systems], Kraków 1998, pp. 143&ff .
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It should be emphasised that enlightened absolutism was an attempt at mod-
ernising the old social and political order, and a  fairly effi  cient one, should we 
take into account the robustness of centralist monarchies in Austria, Prussia, and 
Russia, as contrasted with a classic example of absolutist monarchy in France abol-
ished towards the end of the 18th century in the bloodthirsty revolution3.
How then was Polish statehood moulded into its fi nal form?
3
Up until the end of the estate monarchy, the political structure of the Polish 
state did not diff er signifi cantly from the political structures that operated in other 
European states. Th e situation began to change however as a result of the excep-
tionally broad privileges acquired by the Polish nobility. Th e year 1454 is assumed 
to have brought an end to the monarchy of estates in Poland as the noble estate 
claimed and acquired the leading position in the state structure, depriving the king 
of the supreme legislative power, the right to levy extraordinary taxes, and raising 
the noble pospolite ruszenie (levee-en-masse) without the consent of noblemen’s 
land assemblies (sejmiki). Unlike in most European countries, no absolutism de-
veloped in Poland. On the contrary, a peculiar form of political structure – rzecz-
pospolita szlachecka, or the Noble Republic – began to take shape.
Th e period of the Noble Republic continued until the demise of the state in 
1795 and brought the transfer of power into the hands of a single estate: the nobil-
ity, and especially that part of the nobility which is defi ned as the propertied no-
bility. Until the early 17th century, power was held by the nobility as a single whole, 
later there came a shift  towards the reinforcement of the position of magnates at 
the expense of all the other layers of the noble estate4.
In the Union of Lublin concluded in 1569, the Noble Republic became the 
commonwealth of two states – Poland (referred to as Th e Crown) and the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania – united by the ties of a real union: a particular form of con-
federation. It assumed the existence of a single ruler and a single parliament, and 
common foreign policy, while maintaining separate laws, offi  ces, armies, treasury, 
and courts5. 
3 J. Malec, Ustrój polityczny, [Political system], [in:] Encyklopedia historyczna świata, [Histo-
rical encyclopaedia of the world], Vol. 5: Historia nowożytna, [Modern history], ed. by A. Pod-
raza, Kraków 2000, pp. 112&ff .
4 Z. Kaczmarczyk, B. Leśnodorski, Historia państwa i prawa Polski, [History of Polish state 
and law], Vol. 2: Od połowy XV wieku do r. 1795, [From mid-15th century to 1795], ed. by J. Bar-
dach, Warszawa 1966, pp. 31&ff , 189&ff , 474&ff .
5 J. Malec, Szkice z dziejów federalizmu i myśli federalistycznej w nowożytnej Europie, [Essays 
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A characteristic trait of the Noble Democracy as a system was the weakness 
of royal power. Hence the conviction that the Polish state may not be considered 
a pure monarchy but rather a particular type of formal mixture: the so-called re-
publica mixta. It involved the assumption of the republican terminology with si-
multaneous maintenance of the institution of monarchy. Yet, aft er the introduction 
of elections to the throne, the monarch was elected by the rank and fi le nobility, 
was subject to the law, and could even be dethroned since the nobility could deny 
their allegiance to him if he violated the law. Such a law, the famous articulus de 
non praestanda oboedientia (the article on the right to pledge defi ance), was taken 
down in the Henrician Articles accepted in 1576 (though formulated three years 
earlier) and entered into the coronation pledge of Polish kings.
Th e highest organ of power in the state was the Sejm, where the monarch was 
only one of the three estates participating, besides the Senate and the Chamber of 
Envoys (lower house of the Sejm). Th e Full Sejm took shape in the latter half of the 
15th century, and continued to broaden its competence during the two next cen-
turies. It was believed that through the agency of the Sejm, the nobility exercised 
its sovereign power in the state. Th is is why it took over full legislative authority, 
approval of taxation, summoning the levee-en-masse and the mustering of merce-
nary troops, the right to wage war, and control over foreign policy. Furthermore, 
its prerogatives included ennoblement (granting nobility to non-nobles and nat-
uralisation of foreign nobility through indygenat), and the exercising of the right 
of pardon.
Th e Sejm consisted of two chambers: the Senate and the Chamber of Envoys. 
Th e Senate evolved from the former royal council and consisted of Catholic arch-
bishops and bishops, and senatorial offi  cials temporary: palatine governors (wo-
jewodowie) and castellans and a group of dignitaries known as ministers. Th eir 
number included the Chancellor, Deputy Chancellor, marshals (of court and of 
the crown), and the Grand Treasurer. Aft er the Union of Lublin, their counterparts 
from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Royal Prussia entered the Senate. From 
1505, the Chamber of Envoys only represented the nobility. Envoys were elected 
at land assemblies and equipped with instructions on how to vote at the Sejm, in 
line with the preferences of their electors. Later they were obliged to swear these 
instructions under oath, which made them represent the interest of their constit-
uency (land) rather than the state. Th e sessions of the Chamber were chaired by 
the Marshal of the Sejm selected from among the envoys.
from the history of federalism and the federalist thought in modern Europe], 2nd ed., Kraków 
2003, pp. 39&ff .
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From the moment of adopting the Henrician Articles as the fundamental rights, 
the monarch was obliged to convene Sejm every alternate year. Th e summoning of 
extraordinary Sejms, between the ordinary sessions, was reserved for special situa-
tions. Th e brief and strictly defi ned duration of sessions (six weeks, and two in the 
case of extraordinary Sejms) could be extended only if the consent of all the envoys 
was achieved. Th e agenda of the proceedings was shaped through practice and was 
never suffi  ciently standardised. Th e laws adopted by the Sejm were referred to as 
konstytucje and were published in the name of the king.
For the Sejm to pass a law, not only was the unanimity of all the envoys required 
but also the consent of the Senate and the king. Th is would later turn into one of the 
main reasons for the crisis of the Sejm, and consequently of the entire state. It is to 
be emphasised that in the practice of noble democracy, this principle of unanimity 
was oft en suspended, and the dissent of the minority was disregarded. Th e right of 
dissent was vested in every envoy, which led to the infamous liberum veto. Th e lat-
ter was initially treated as an absolutely extraordinary measure to guarantee and 
safeguard the noble liberties. Until mid-17th century, it however never happened 
that a single envoy would disrupt the session of the Sejm.
Early in the 16th century, the idea of the sovereignty of law in the state pre-
vailed among the nobility. Now, even the ruler was subjected to the idea, following 
the principle which pronounced that in Polonia lex est rex (“in Poland, law is the 
king”)6. Th e constitution of Nihil Novi of 1505 limited royal power, transferring 
legislation into the hands of the Sejm, where the monarch was only one of the 
three elements of the legislative process. He was left  with the supreme adminis-
trative powers, which in practice was mostly limited, to the nomination of state 
offi  cials, formal command of the army, and management of foreign policy between 
the sessions of the Sejm. Th is resulted in the institution of the king evolving rather 
towards the position of lifelong president of the noble ‘republic’. Unlike in the ab-
solutist model, where the monarch was law (rex est lex) and exercised the supreme 
power, in Poland one could at most quote Jan Zamoyski’s rex regnat et non guber-
nat (“the king reigns but does not rule”), with his reign being actually limited to 
the minimum.
Th e so called resident Senators formed the institution appointed to serve the 
king with counsel and exercise control over his policy. Th e 16 resident Senators 
were appointed at ordinary Sejms, of which four were to remain constantly by 
the monarch. Th ey reported to the Sejm on their activity. Introduced on the basis 
6 See: W. Uruszczak, “Sejm walny wszystkich państw naszych”. Konstytucja Nihil novi i sejm 
w Radomiu w 1505 roku, [“Th e General Assembly of all our states”. Th e Nihil Novi Constitution 
and the Sejm in Radom in 1505], Radom 2005, [p. 5] [unpaged].
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of the Henrician Articles, they were another element limiting the monarch’s inde-
pendence of action.
In the regions, the nobility exercised rule through land assemblies (sejmiki). 
Being organs of noblemen’s local government, these were gaining in importance 
due to the anachronistic structure of local administration. It was here that the 
main substance of state power began to concentrate from the mid-17th century 
onwards, due to the weakening position of the Sejm and the progressive decentral-
isation of executive power. Th is brought about the peculiar form of “rule of land 
assemblies”7. 
It is to be emphasised that the nobility exercising their political rights, e.g. 
through the election of the monarch, participation in land assemblies, and elec-
tion of the Sejm envoys, amounted to 8–10% of the country’s population: a most 
unusual phenomenon on a European scale. In comparison with this, in England, 
considered the cradle of democracy, such a high proportion of population had not 
acquired election rights until the 1st half of the 19th century.
All the positions in the state were lifelong tenures, without much attention paid 
to the competence of the candidates. A network of purely titular offi  ces developed 
and included cup-bearers (cześnicy), masters of the pantry (stolnicy), sword-bear-
ers (miecznicy), masters of the hunt (łowczy), etc. Th e utter lack of modern, bu-
reaucratised forms of administration was quite an unpraiseworthy feature distin-
guishing Poland from other European states.
Th e estate-based judiciary structures continued to the end of the “Noble Re-
public”. For the nobility, the district courts administered by royal starosts, cas-
tellans, and chamberlains were the lower courts. Th e Crown Tribunal, a court of 
appellate jurisdiction was established in 1578, with its counterpart Lithuanian 
Tribunal established for Lithuania in 15818. Th e courts of the municipal council 
7 J. Malec, Ustrój polityczny…, pp. 126&ff .
8 Volumina Legum, vol. 2, pp. 962–969. See also: A. Lisiecki, Trybunał Główny Koronny siedmią 
splendorów oświecony, [Th e High Crown Court in the light of seven splendours], Kraków 1638; 
H. Rutkowski, Trybunał Koronny w  Piotrkowie, [Th e Crown Court in Piotrków], [in:] Dzieje 
Piotrkowa Trybunalskiego, [History of Piotrków Trybunalski], ed. by B. Baranowski, Łódź 1989; 
W. Zarzycki, Trybunał Koronny dawnej Rzeczypospolitej, [Th e High Crown Court of the bygo-
ne Commonwealth], Piotrków Trybunalski 1993; I. Wierzchowiecka, Uwagi do funkcjonowa-
nia Trybunału Litewskiego na tle przemian ustrojowych Rzeczypospolitej w drugiej połowie XVII 
wieku, [Comments on the functioning of the Lithuanian Court against the systemic changes in 
the Commonwealth in the latter half of the 17th century], [in:] Wielokulturowość polskiego po-
granicza. Ludzie – Idee – Prawo, [Multiculturality of the Polish boarded marches. People – ideas 
– law], ed. by A. Lityński, P. Fiedorczyk, Białystok 2003, pp. 343–348; W. Witkowski, Trybunał 
Koronny w Lublinie – organizacja i funkcjonowanie, [Th e Crown Court in Lublin – organisation 
and operation], [in:] 400-lecie utworzenia Trybunału Koronnego w Lublinie, [400 years of establi-
shing the Crown Court in Lublin], ed. by H. Groszyk, W. Ćwik, W. Witkowski, Lublin 1982, p. 59.
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and bench as well as some higher courts under the German Magdeburg Law, 
continued their operation in the cities. Th e last of these were losing their im-
portance due to the establishment of the supreme court of appeal chaired by the 
Chancellor in the capacity of the appellate court in municipal matters. In villag-
es, the judicial authority remained in the hands of landowners, who acquired 
the right to punish their subjects even with the death sentence. Such a  prac-
tice was rarely resorted to, however, because the cases subject to capital punish-
ment were rather transferred for consideration by the court of the nearest city 
or borough.
A major weakness in the organisation of the state was the weakness of the 
army. Treatment of the levee-en-masse of the nobility as the primary armed force 
helped to increase the threat that the neighbouring states posed for Poland.
Th e political structural model of the state did not change at the time of the 
oligarchy of the magnates. What nonetheless changed, due to the magnates cap-
turing the structures of power, was the circle of persons deciding about the polit-
ical life of the country. Zebrzydowski’s Rebellion (1606–1607) when nobility for 
the last time took to arms to disrupt the alliance between the king and senators 
and to check the attempts to introduce absolute power, is assumed as the begin-
ning of oligarchic rule. Th e defeat of the rebellion became the beginning of the 
reign of magnates who completely took over at the helm in the latter half of the 
17th century, aft er the Lubomirski Rebellion. It was followed by a further decline 
in the position of the monarch and the decrease in the political importance of 
the middle nobility resulting from the economic crisis being the aft ermath of the 
numerous wars in which the Commonwealth was involved in that century. Th e 
middle nobility would ever more frequently become a compliant and obedient 
tool in the hands of magnates competing for power among themselves. Refer-
ences by the continuously governing elite to the, allegedly valid, principle of no-
ble equality fl attered the nobility, giving them an illusory sense of participation 
in the exercise of power. Th is in turn favoured the stability of government by the 
magnatial oligarchy, contributing to the decomposition of state structures.
4
Th is was the time when the doctrine of the “Golden Freedom” of the nobility 
was spreading. Th is doctrine’s basic foci of attention seemed to be free elections 
and liberum veto. Moreover, the doctrine assumed that there was a need to acquire 
balance inter maiestatem et libertatem, i.e. between the king pursuing the strength-
ening of power at the cost of the nobles, and the noble liberties leading to anarchy. 
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Th e Senate, which was becoming ever more the symbol of oligarchic rule, was 
perceived to be the institution safeguarding this balance9.
As far as the organisation of state authorities was concerned, this was the time 
of signifi cant limitation of royal prerogatives and further decentralisation of the 
state. In the year 1652, the dissent of a single envoy was recognised as valid for 
the fi rst time on occasion of voting on the prolongation of the session of the Sejm. 
Liberum veto was slowly becoming a means frequently resorted to in the interest 
of individual magnate dynasties, and oft en also of foreign powers. Th is stymied 
the sessions of the Sejm, and consequently paralysed the entire state. Th e Saxon 
Era (1697–1762) was the time of the worst decline, with only fi ve Sejms managing 
to complete their sessions. Parallel to the progressive disorganisation of the state 
apparatus, the importance of the private magnate ‘estates’, frequently featuring de-
veloped structures of bureaucratic administration closer in character to absolute 
monarchies, continued to grow.
Th is is how the model of the state defi ned in the 16th century as modern and ca-
pable of being a counterweight, if not competitor, to absolutist tendencies began to 
degenerate and consequently weaken the structures of the state itself. Th e peculiar 
anomaly of Polish political structures that had most positive connotations even 
during the “Golden Age” began to acquire an increasingly negative sense through-
out the 17th and especially during the 18th century.
Under the reign of the Saxon kings, with the ideas of enlightenment penetrat-
ing to Poland the primal modern concepts postulating full reform of the political 
order in the Commonwealth began to surface. Th e danger resulting from the con-
viction popular among the majority of the nobility that “it is by lack of rule that 
Poland stands” guaranteeing the promising future of the state and its inviolable 
status quo, began to be noticed. Th e political reality was entirely diff erent. Th e de-
crease of Poland’s standing on the international scene, the permanent disruptions 
of Sejms and land assemblies, the lack of strong central power, and the local ad-
ministration being taken over by an ineffi  cient and formally anachronistic nobles’ 
government, not to mention the meagre army – all these brought about the fi nal 
fall of the Commonwealth. At the same time, the presence of strong absolute pow-
ers as neighbours equipped with effi  cient, centralised apparatus of power made the 
threat very real.
Th e reform of the state undertaken in the years 1764–1792 was to counter such 
a state of aff airs. Its high point was the time of the Four Years’ Sejm, which adopted 
the Constitution of 3rd May 1791 – Europe’s fi rst, and the world’s second written 
constitution – in order to build modern structures of public authority. Th is was 
9 S. Grodziski, op. cit., pp. 152&ff .
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the fi rst Constitution in continental Europe that provided not only for the consti-
tutional but also for the political (vote of no confi dence) responsibility of govern-
ment to parliament.
5
All in all, the reforms embarked on came too late. Unfortunately, the political 
model of the political structure of the state defi ned in the “Governing Act” of 1791 
(Ustawa Rządowa) did not last long. Its fi nal demise was caused by the events that 
occurred soon aft er 1792: the Confederation of Targowica, the Sejm of Grodno, 
and the Th ird Partitioning of Poland. Yet it would be impossible to only look for 
the reasons of the fall of the Commonwealth in external factors, in the decomposi-
tion of state institutions and the escalation of anarchy under the reign of the kings 
of Saxon dynasty, and in the peculiarly Polish anomaly of political order that did 
not stand the test when confronted with the centralised absolute monarchies of 
the neighbouring powers. Contributions to such a fall must have included the still 
premature attempt to build a democratic state based on the rule of law in Poland10.
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Th e Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania at the time 
of the Noble Democracy – a Polish Anomaly?
Th e article deals with the specifi city of the noble democracy in the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. Contrary to the absolutism dominant in Western Europe, where the 
fullness of power was concentrated in the hands of the monarch, in Poland, starting from 
the 16th century, power passed into the hands of the noble state, and republican forms 
were mixed with monarchist ones (the so-called republica mixta).Th e Sejm becomes the 
highest organ of power, bringing together the full legislative power, the power of the 
elected monarch gets limited, the administrative structure – based on lifetime offi  ces – is 
anachronistic (until the middle of the 18th century), the judiciary retains its state charac-
ter and from the 16th century becomes independent of the king, which is unique compa-
red to most of the then existing countries. Th e system of democracy of the nobility cre-
ated at that time clearly distinguishes the Polish political system from the solutions that 
were dominating during the modern era. In the fi rst half of the 18th century, this form of 
government becomes deformed. During the magnate oligarchy, real power passes into 
the hands of a small group of the richest. Poland is in the state of decline. To counteract 
this, reforms are being gradually introduced during the reign of Stanisław August Po-
niatowski, the last Polish king. However, they prove to be long overdue. Th e constitution 
passed on May 3, 1791 – the second in the world – did not last long, and the third par-
tition of Poland meant the loss of independence for 123 years. Th e reasons for the fall 
of the Republic of Poland can be found in the external factors, in the disintegration of 
state institutions and the growing anarchy, but also in a specifi c Polish systemic anomaly, 
which did not withstand the confrontation with the centralized absolute monarchy of the 
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neighbouring countries.Th e attempt to build in Poland a democratic state based on law 
turned out to be premature.
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Rzeczpospolita w dobie demokracji szlacheckiej, 
czyli tzw. polska anomalia?
Artykuł traktuje o specyfi ce ustroju demokracji szlacheckiej w Rzeczypospolitej Obojga 
Narodów. W przeciwieństwie do dominującego na zachodzie Europie absolutyzmu, gdzie 
pełnia władzy skoncentrowana była w ręku monarchy, w Polsce od XVI w. władza prze-
chodzi w ręce stanu szlacheckiego, a formy republikańskie mieszają się z monarchistycz-
nymi (tzw. republica mixta). Najwyższym organem władzy, skupiającym pełnię władzy 
ustawodawczej, staje się sejm, władza elekcyjnego monarchy jest ograniczana, struktura 
administracji – oparta na dożywotnich urzędach – jest anachroniczna (do poł. XVIII w.), 
sądownictwo zachowuje charakter stanowy i od XVI w. uniezależnia się od króla, co stano-
wi ewenement w porównaniu z większością ówczesnych państw. Stworzony wówczas sys-
tem demokracji stanu szlacheckiego zdecydowanie wyróżnia polski model ustrojowy na 
tle dominujących w dobie nowożytnej rozwiązań. W pierwszej połowie XVIII w. następuje 
deformacja tej formy rządów. W okresie oligarchii magnackiej realna władza przechodzi 
w ręce nielicznej grupy najbogatszych. Polska chyli się ku upadkowi. Przeciwdziałać temu 
mają reformy wprowadzane stopniowo za panowania ostatniego króla Stanisława Augusta 
Poniatowskiego. Są one jednak spóźnione. Uchwalona 3 maja 1791 r. konstytucja – druga 
na świecie – nie przetrwała długo, a trzeci rozbiór Polski oznaczał utratę niepodległości 
na 123 lata. Przyczyn upadku Rzeczypospolitej można upatrywać w czynnikach zewnętrz-
nych, w rozkładzie instytucji państwowych i nasilającej się anarchii, ale także w specyfi cz-
nej polskiej anomalii ustrojowej, która nie wytrzymała konfrontacji ze scentralizowaną 
monarchią absolutną państw ościennych. Okazało się, że próba budowania w Polsce de-
mokratycznego państwa opartego na prawie była przedwczesna.
Słowa kluczowe: Rzeczpospolita szlachecka, ustrój polityczny, demokracja szlachecka, 
oligarchia magnacka, ustrój polityczny, Sejm, urzędy, sądownictwo
